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Project Management in Product Development:
Toward a Framework for Targeted Flexibility
Antonie Jetter, Fatima Albar

Portland State University, Dept. of Engineering and Technology Management, Portland, OR - USA
Abstract--As a discipline, project management has been
accused of having lost its relevance for innovative initiatives
because it emphasizes planning and control over the flexibility
and learning-based strategies that are needed to succeed under
uncertainty. Several authors therefore recommend adaptive
project management practices – sometimes named “targeted
flexibility” – that respond to project characteristics commonly
found in innovation, namely novelty, complexity, speed and – as
a result – uncertainty. This paper investigates how this proposed
adaptation of project management occurs in a context with high
levels of novelty that organizes work in projects and needs to
accommodate projects of different pace, complexity and
innovativeness: product development in small and medium
enterprises that do research and development work in the same
organizational unit. Results of a literature review and two
exploratory studies, covering a total of 8 companies with
multiple projects each, are presented. Implications for a future
framework for targeted flexibility are developed, leading to the
identification of the following needs for project management:
(1) better understanding of the many ways in which project
management impacts exploration and exploitation activities, (2)
improved attention for the currently poorly supported preproject and early initiation stages, (3) a shift of focus from
monitoring against plans toward monitoring against achieved
learning, and (4) the formulation of transition paths from
current new product development practice to higher project
management maturity.

I. INTRODUCTION
"what is sound management practice for incremental
innovation - where speed, cycle time, and quick cash
recovery are primary objectives - might actually
hamper the radical innovation's progress" [1].

targeted flexibility and tools and practices for achieving it are
scarce in the academic and the practitioner literature.
To help foster research on project management practices
for highly innovative endeavors, this paper focuses on the
context of new product development as a prototypical
example of a project environment with high levels of
innovation. Specifically, it investigates contributors for a
future practice of targeted flexibility from three streams of
literature: product innovation, organizational theory, and
project management. Following the review and synthesis of
the state-of-the-art it explores how the recommendations
gleaned from the literature are implemented in practice. To
this end, it investigates the project management practices of 8
different companies by analyzing multiple projects per
company. Data analysis is not yet completed, but early results
of this study already suggest the need for future research
towards a framework for targeted flexibility.
The paper makes several contributions: First, it
systematically reviews largely distinct streams of literature on
product innovation, organizational ambidexterity, and project
management, and integrates them into a research framework.
Second, it opens the black box of project management
practice in new product development and identifies companyspecific and project-specific adaptations of standard new
product development and project management practices.
Some of these adaptions are explicit, while others occur
“under the radar. And third, it synthesizes these findings and
provides recommendations for future directions of project
management research, targeted at improving the disciplines
relevance in product innovation.
II. CONTRIBUTORS TO TARGETED FLEXIBILITY

The project management discipline has been accused of
losing its relevance for innovation initiatives because it
overemphasizes linear project management approaches that
are well-suited for controllable projects but poorly adapted to
high-uncertainty endeavors [2]. Lenfle and Loch [2] have
therefore called for a new project paradigm, called targeted
flexibility, that takes uncertainty into account and manages
routine project modules with a planning-driven approach,
whereas high uncertainty modules are managed through
learning-based approaches. Adaptive approaches to project
management have furthermore been recommended by [3] and
[4]. Also, in order to tackle the challenge of complex
projects, Project Management Institute (www.pmi.org), a
leading knowledge provider to project management
practitioners, increasingly emphasizes the importance of
culture, talent management, and stakeholder communications.
However, to date, PMI does not provide a standard for

A. Product Innovation Management
Product development organizes work in projects and
operates in a context with very high levels of innovation. Yet,
the product innovation literature traditionally gives little
attention to project management, as it has long been
dominated by empirical research that investigates the link
between product and project characteristics and product
success [2],[3]. The research is not theory-driven and does
not typically investigate the inside of the project management
‘black box’ [7] but provides managerial recommendations
based on project factors that correlate with success. It
recommends rigorous up-front planning, documentation of
plans and progress to improve communication and
commitment, cross-functional teams, and decision gates that
secure senior management buy-in. Brown and Eisenhardt [7]
characterize this approach as the rational plan perspective
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Figure 1. Stage-Gate for New Product Development

because it explains the success of new products as the result
of carefully planning a superior product for a well-chosen
business opportunity and executing this plan flawlessly.
This perspective has been highly influential in managerial
practice. Accordingly, the most common approach to
organizing new product development projects is a linear
process model with decision points that separate sequential
project phases, such as the Stage-Gate©-system [8] or the
generic product development model by Ulrich and Eppinger
[9]. Gate reviews are based on objective criteria that reflect
what the organization knows to be important for project
success (see Fig. 1).
Each gate review requires a specific set of deliverables
that spell out what actions should be taken and what
information needs to be presented for the review [8], [10].
The self-documenting nature of the process enables
continuous process improvement [11]. Linear process
management approaches with gates have been linked to
improved product success, but also criticized for being too
specification-driven, rather than customer-driven, too
heavyweight for simple projects, and too constraining for
radical innovation [8], [12], [13].
One set of concerns focuses on the potential of
introducing too much rigidity into organizational routines and
cultures. To obtain approval, product development teams
may commit to precise project parameters and freeze product
specifications early in the development process, even against
their better judgment [11], [14], [15]. After approval, a
project team may engage in a project execution mindset and
focus on the project plan and whatever is required to sail
through the new gate, rather than making changes to the
project to response to new market and technology insights
[13]. The problem is aggravated by one of the principles of
the Stage-Gate© methodology - ‘do it right the first time’
[16] that causes the process to not explicitly account for
backtracking into earlier stages. Moreover, the fact that a
project has passed formal reviews - often with high level

management involvement - may make it difficult to later
propose an alternative course of action or to terminate it [17].
Proponents of linear product development frameworks, such
as Cooper [18], state that these concerns are sufficiently
addressed within those frameworks. They point out that gate
reviews should not be done in a bureaucratic manner, but
review criteria should fit the specifics of the project.
Moreover, conditional gates -paired with risk analysis- allow
some projects to move forward, even if it has not yet met all
gate criteria- however, according to Sethi and Iqual [13] with
only limited impact on reducing unwanted rigidities.
A second set of concerns is focused at the practicability of
the process under different conditions, such as innovations
that require a very high level of user involvement [19],
projects that follow open innovation paradigm [20], projects
that are not focused on product, but on process innovation
[21] or incremental projects for which a full gate review may
be overkilling. These issues have typically addressed by both,
theoretical expansions of the basic linear process model [8],
and modifications of standard linear practices as they occur in
industry practice [6], [22]. Among others, these changes
allow companies to ‘fast track’ decisions by dropping stages,
to revisit earlier stages, and to add iterative design-test-build
cycles to acquire more meaningful customer input when
knowledge is sticky [8]. This has led to a considerable
expansion of options. When the Stage-Gate system was first
conceptualized, it was intended to bring process management
thinking to the innovation process by providing a "skeleton
from which to develop a custom-tailored model" [23]. In
current publication, recommendations are more complex and
differentiate - among others - between major new products,
moderately risk projects, and minor change projects, all of
which are executed with a different version of the Stage-Gate
model. Cooper’s third generation Stage-Gate-Model, for
example, is still inherently linear but provides flexibility to
omit or bypass stages and gates and execute activities in
parallel, as long as this occurs deliberately, consciously and
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with full awareness of facts, consequences, and risk [24]. For
lower risk projects, Cooper subsequently developed ‘lite’ and
‘Xpress’ process versions and a significant customer request
(SCR) variant with an iterative style customer involvement
[8].
By moving away from a once relatively simple, linear
standard process to a range of process options, the product
innovation literature clearly demonstrates the need for
targeted flexibility in managing innovative projects.
Moreover, it increasingly discusses fundamental challenges
to the success of structured management approaches in the
so-called fuzzy front-end of radical innovation. The fuzzy
front-end precede formal project evaluation and a go /no-go
funding decision [25] and entails all activities up to and
including gate 3 in Cooper's model (see Fig. 1). While Fig.1
implies a similarity between front-end and later stage
decision-making, the literature states that front-end
management may be substantially different from the
management of later stages of new product development.
According to Koen et al. [26] front-end is experimental, often
chaotic, and difficult to plan and characterized by
unpredictable commercialization dates, uncertain revenue
expectations and variable budgeting approaches that often
include bootstrapping. In contrast, the actual new product
development project begins after the front-end and is
structured, disciplined, and goal-oriented with a project plan.
Accordingly, front-end research aims to manage front-end
fuzziness [27]. This is achieved by keeping the front-end
short and focused on developing stable project definitions, as
well as by creating a system of evaluation points that is
capable of quickly identifying and funding projects that will
be technically and commercially successful, fit company
strategy, and support the desired project portfolio mix [5],
[28], [29]. According to Khurana and Rosenthal [30], two
contrasting approaches are used to achieve these objectives:
Some companies employ a formal front-end approach that
prescribes a process with clear standards for building,
documenting, and approving a business case for a new
product development project. Others rely on a culture-driven,
more emergent approach to develop a joint project vision and
buy-in for development projects that relies on strong crossfunctional interactions and subtle control through
management and stakeholder agreement. This informal
process is suitable and more commonly applied for the frontend of radical new product innovations [30]–[32] .
One important observation of researchers is that some of
the front-end fuzziness associated with radically new
products appears to carry over into later product development
stages. Veryzer [33] finds that product development teams in
radical innovation projects still engage in considerable
prototyping, lead user testing, and design modifications after
project approval: In the case of discontinuous products many

of the activities that one would expect should be undertaken
prior to product development - understanding customer needs
and market assessment - will necessarily lag slightly behind
the design and (formative) prototyping steps that would
normally precede. Verworn et al. [34] find that in radical new
products, there are lower levels of clarity on competitors,
market size, and customer price sensitivity, even after the
project is approved [34]. Also, Lewis et al. [35] investigate
project management styles and project uncertainty within a
single company from six months after project start to project
completion. Despite all having cleared front-end evaluation
within the same organization, the projects differ greatly with
regard to uncertainty levels in later stages of product
development.
B. Organizational Ambidexterity
Organizational theory has long been interested in socalled ambidexterity, which enables companies to hone and
exploit an existing knowledge base, as well as to explore
innovative opportunities that build on different competencies.
Exploitation initiatives are looking for solutions inside the
existing technologies and for the existing market and
therefore are more likely to have predictable return on
investment. They increase the fit and alignment of the
organization with the evolutionary changes in the market,
e.g., by lowering costs or modifying product offerings to
accommodate new customer requirements. In contrast,
exploration initiatives are seeking solutions beyond the
company's existing technologies or markets. They are
vaguer, less certain and slower to produce results but give
new competencies to the organization that allows it confront
the revolutionary changes in the business environment, such
as market shifts and the emergence of disruptive technologies
[36]–[41]. Ambidexterity is a prerequisite for competitive
success when business environments are neither slow to ever
change or so volatile, that knowledge quickly become
obsolete. In the first case, heavy emphasis on exploitation,
paired with an incremental growth of the knowledge base
suffices. In the latter case, the necessity to ‘unlearn' old
knowledge and frequently create new knowledge results in a
strong emphasis on exploration.
The literature generally agrees that exploitation and
exploration require different structures, processes,
management styles, cultures, values, and even measures of
success [36], [42], [43] [44] and that organizations typically
emphasize one aspect over the other. Projects that do not fit
the preferred model either are not approved at all, morphed
into a different, more familiar project type, or defunded
during execution. Table 1, adapted from Govindarajan &
Trimble [36], highlights the key differences between typical
planning approaches for exploitation-oriented projects and
planning principles for exploration:
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TABLE 1 PLANNING APPROACHES FOR EXPLORATION VS. EXPLOITATION PROJECT
Planning principles for radical innovation
Project management practices for high performance
Planning and management attention in proportion to budget
Invest heavily in planning
Use the last project as a template and modify
Create a plan and metrics for success from scratch
Focus on data
Discuss data and assumptions
Document clear expectations
Document a clear hypothesis of record
Be on budget, on time, and on spec
Find a way to spend a little, learn a lot
All innovation projects are discussed in the same forum
Create a separate forum for discussing radical innovation projects
Deliver the results in the plan
Frequently reassess the plan
Analyze totals
Analyze trends
Revisions are frowned upon
Allow formal revisions to predictions
Evaluate based on results
Evaluate innovation leaders subjectively

Because of these differences organizational theory
frequently proposes to separate exploitation and exploration
in space or time. In the case of structural differentiation these
activities occur through two or more separate organizational
units, such as a central research organization, a spin-off
company, or an external design firm for exploration and
product-focused development for exploitation [37], [40],
[45]. This separation enables the organization to plan, lead,
and evaluate exploration and exploitation teams with
different styles and methods while using appropriate
individuals and managers for each. A separation in time
occurs when the organization practices exploitation or
exploration for some period of time and then switches its
emphasis and activities to the other practice [37], [39], [46],
[47]. This process of transitioning is sometimes characterized
as punctuated equilibrium.
The organizational separation of exploitation and
exploration is theoretically intriguing but comes with
considerable practical challenges. Separation by time forces
companies to undergo times of major disruption, if not crisis,
to make the transition from one stage to the next. Separation
by organizational unit may result in exploration that ventures
too far from what the market accepts. Companies may
therefore not want to separate cutting-edge technology
development from the strong product and market focus that
their business units can provide. The demise of central
research labs, such as Xerox Parc and Bell Labs speaks to this
problem. Particularly smaller organizations may also find
separation to be impractical if they do not have enough
engineers and scientists to staff and consistently employ a
separate research organization. They may also have little
duplication of skills among their employees and therefore
cannot assign individuals either to exploitation or exploration
projects because their skillsets are needed in both. With
blurry boundaries like this, however, all projects are likely to
inherit the dominant organizational paradigm and separation
is impossible. The problem is aggravated when products have
high exploration content in product development, such as the
design and manufacture of customer-specific specialty
machinery. Finally, exploration is not only necessary in
technology or product development, but may take the form of
planning and testing a new service offering, logistics
approach, or business model. Exploration projects of this
nature are likely to include so many business functions that

separation is impossible, short of recreating an entirely
separate organization.
In response to the challenges of separation-based
approaches to ambidexterity, organizational theory
increasingly emphasizes the concept of integration.
Integration refers to the degree to which the individuals who
are responsible for exploration and exploitation organically
relate to each other and transfer knowledge, information and
experience [37], [40], [45], [46]. In its extreme form,
integration occurs by charging individuals with both,
explorative and exploitative activities, at the same time.
While people are unlikely to equally excel at both activities
[42], it appears that most individuals can perform
ambidextrously to some extent. However, having
ambidextrous individuals does not make an organization
ambidextrous [37]. A supportive organizational context with
strong social support and performance management [46] is
needed, as are dense social relations [48]. Some of the
integration appears to be achieved through project
management: de-centralized decision making, such as
empowered project teams, appear to improve explorative
innovation without negative impacts on exploitation and a
formalization of decision making through standard processes
and manuals improves exploitation without harming
exploration [48]. Moreover, project teams in complex
projects appear to achieve temporal separation on the project
level, rather than on the level of organizational units, as they
“cycle” through phases of exploration and planning when
they start working on new work break down structure items
and execution and exploitation when they execute on these
plans [49].
C. Project Management
The most common approach to organizing new product
development projects is a linear process model with decision
points that separate sequential phases in a project’s lifecycle,
such as the Stage-Gate-Model illustrated in Figure 1. The
process is adapted from its first generation predecessor
approach, developed by NASA's PPP (phased project
planning) in early 1960s, by adding - among others - a strong
customer focus and cross-functionality. It thus shares the
same roots as the project framework promoted by PMI
(Project Management Institute) and globally used by project
management professionals. The two frameworks, however,
are not identical. Figure 2 maps SG phases (top row) against
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Figure 2: Stage-Gate and Project Management phases

project life cycle stages as described in PMI’s standards [50].
Each project phase is characterized by its emphasis on
particular project management processes (so-called process
groups). The life cycle stage “start”, for example,
encompasses a variety of initiation activities, some of which
may still carry over into later stages, even after the output of
the phase, the project charter, is produced. Within the project
management framework, a development project is typically

considered complete when the product is handed off to
manufacturing.
Table 2 compares key activities and instruments of SG, as
described in the new product development literature to the
key processes (as defined by PMI’s standards). Notably, both
frameworks have some similar phases, approaches, and
outputs.

TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF THE KEY ACTIVITIES OF SG AND PMI PROCESS, BASED ON [50], [16]

Phase 1

NPD/SG
Initial Screen, followed by Preliminary Investigation
Key activities:
(1) Preliminary Market, Technical, and Business/Financial Assessment,
based on quick, low-cost research, resulting in the approval to move
to the next phase

Phase 2

Detailed Investigation / Business Case, resulting in a Go/No-Go decision.
Key activities:
(1) Product and Project Definition (target market, product concept,
product attributes and features, value proposition and positioning,
engineering requirements and high-level specs)
(2) Project justification and alignment with strategy & portfolio
(Business analysis, financial analysis, risk assessment)
(3) Detailed Project Plan for Development; Preliminary plans for later
stages (timelines, deliverables, resources)
(1) & (2) are often documented in a product innovation charter

Phase 3

Development
Key activities:
(1) Rapid prototyping

DOE (Lussier and Coleman; 201
(2) Collect customer feedback
(3) Alpha testing

Phase 4

Testing & Validation
Key activities:
(1) Further Alpha testing with validation through:

House of Quality

QFD
(2) Beta testing
(3) Develop launch and post-launch plans

Phase 5

Full Production and Market Launch
Key activities:
(1) Roll out
(2) Produce at full capacity
(3) Monitor results
(4) Plan full life cycle

PMBOK Process Groups

Initiation
Key activities:
(1) Stakeholder analysis
(2) Development of Project Charter, consisting of:

Project purpose and justification

Measurable Project Objectives

High-level project descriptions and scope

High-level risks

Summary milestone schedule and budgets

Project approval requirements

Project manager assignment
Planning
Key activities:
(1) Establish the scope of the project
(2) Refine the objectives, and define the course of action required to
attain the objectives that the project was undertaken to achieve
(3) Quality Planning
(4) Risk Management Planning
Execution
Key activities:
(1) Complete the work defined in the project management
plan to satisfy the project specifications
(2) Perform Quality Assurance
Control
Key activities:
(1) Quality Analysis through:

Pareto's, control charts

House of Quality
(2) Cost and Risk Monitoring
(3) Scope verification
Close-Out
Key activity:
(1) Post-mortem meetings
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The SG framework puts heavy emphasis on the
prioritization and selection of new product programs for
longer term organizational goals [51], which occurs in a preproject stage or the front-end. This stage, which does not
exist in the PMI framework, is considered to be central to
product development success and one of the key
contributions of SG models to NPD practice [52].
The PMI framework, on the other hand, follows the
control theoretical philosophy of monitoring and steering
project execution against plans and organizes planning,
execution, and control in separate and distinct process groups.
It measures project success by comparing product and project
quality, timeliness, budget compliance, and degree of
customer satisfaction against set targets (PMBOK). It also
describes the role of the project managers as monitoring and
controlling the work of producing the products, services, or
results that the project was undertaken to produce. This view
is somewhat at odds with that of NPD scholars who
emphasize that “Stage Gate is not, and never was, intended to
be a control mechanism” [16, p. 113] that allows
management to manage projects on a micro level, such as
timelines, staffing levels, budgets, or costs. The NPD
literature therefore conceptualizes SG as a “business” or
“macro” process that is broader in scope than project
management but should be combined with project
management on the micro level during development, testing,
and launch[24], [52]. Similar assessments can also be found
in the project management literature. For example, a 2008
study concludes that project management, while applicable to
new product development, provides “incomplete perspectives
on NPD” and therefore needs to be applied in combination
with NPD approaches [53]. A recent empirical study [51]
confirms this assessment: project management practices, if
used on their own, fail to deliver positive results when
innovativeness is high. SG has a positive effect on both,
incremental and radical product development efforts. This
effect is reinforced when PM practices are applied within a
SG framework in a complementary fashion.
D. Project management approaches for high uncertainty
projects
The product innovation and the project management
literature have long attempted to characterize project contexts
with regard to how much uncertainty they introduce to the
project. Uncertainty can exist with regard to marketing and
technology aspects of the product (e.g. what customer needs
to address and what technical solutions to implement), as well
as with regard to the how markets, technologies, and the
general business environment will evolve in the future.
Moreover, appropriate resource allocations to projects and
within projects are also uncertain [54].
Most studies focus on what is uncertain (markets,
technologies, environments, etc.) and do not further
conceptualize why uncertainty occurs. Some authors
understand uncertainty as an objective lack of information
that can be healed by gathering additional information until

only “residual” [55] uncertainty remains. This unavoidable
uncertainty, for which no information is available, is
relatively straightforward to manage through traditional risk
management: areas of uncertainty are documented, assessed
with regard to their likelihood of occurrence and the severity
of consequences, and addressed with various risk mitigation
strategies. The underlying notion of these approaches is that
decision-makers fundamentally understand how project
elements and the project environment are linked. They may,
for example, know that a weaker dollar affects project cots,
but they do not know the dollar exchange rate at the time that
payments come due. Other authors [56], [57], however, point
out that uncertainty is perceptual. It exists when a decisionmaker is unable to fully understand the relationships between
project elements. Miliken differentiates state uncertainty
(inability to predict the future state of a variable), effect
uncertainty (inability to judge the impact of a changing
variable) and response uncertainty (lack of information about
response actions and their effects). These uncertainties
preclude the decision-maker from using traditional risk
management approaches. They persist because the situation is
so novel (e.g. markets with entirely new usage patterns,
emerging technologies) and so complex that it is impossible
for the decision-maker to articulate relevant variables and
their functional relationships [58], [59]. This situation is
characterized as ambiguity [56], unforeseeable uncertainty
[59], Unk Unks or Unknown Unknowns [60] or “deep
uncertainty” [61]. It is a result of lack of information, as well
as the persistence of so-called “rugged” project landscapes in
which adjacent points of project performance are loosely
related [59] and project interdependencies cause a small
changes in one project element to result in large changes in
overall project performance. A common analogy for this
phenomenon is search in a geographical region: In projects
with lack of information, but without unk unks, project
managers know where the point of best project performance
is because the one peak in the region is clearly visible from
everywhere, similarly to the view of Mount Hood from the
plains of the Willamette Valley. Project management plans
aim for the peak and plan for risks that can occur along the
way. In uncertain projects managers are operating in deep fog
and cannot see the performance peak or peaks. However, they
can see a little bit of road in front of them and can see if it
slopes upward or downwards. In a non-rugged landscape,
consistently moving forward on a road with an upward slope
will eventually cause the project to get to or very near the
performance peak. In a rugged landscape, however, the
project may end on a relatively small local peak, far away
from the highest peak.
Building on recommendations the project management
and the new product development literature, [59] identify two
strategies to complement traditional risk management for
cases of unk unks, namely trial-and-error learning and
selectionism. A review of project management frameworks in
product innovation management by Sperry and Jetter [62]
also identifies these two fundamental concepts, alongside
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TABLE 3. RECOMMENDED PROJECT MANAGEMENT APPROACHES FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF UNCERTAINTY
Nature of the project
Technology
Market
Recommended project management approach
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
High
High
Trial-and-Error: initial planning steps are non-linear, non-orderly, and
Innovative New Product,
non-predictable and simultaneously focused at discovery and feedback
new functionality with
learning
potential to change current
(equivalent to trial-and-error in [58], [59])
technology paradigm;
market adoption by
visionaries
Medium to
Medium to
Planning steps are focused at testing/validating assumptions through
Significant Improvement
Medium-High
Medium-High
experimentation and feedback, but the approaches differ with regard to
Product
their initial structure:
Significantly improved
functionality through

Recursive: loosely coupled, unstructured steps are decided on
adding and removing of
as feedback information becomes available, making the
features that makes the
actual project activities and outcome relatively unpredictable.
product attractive to
(equivalent to trial-and-error in [58], [59])
mainstream adopters and

Evolving: project steps and feedback loops are planned
adjacent markets
upfront, but length and outcome of each feedback cycle are
unknown. (equivalent to trial-and-error in [58], [59])

Selectionism: project steps are designed to generate and test
alternative solutions in parallel and select the best alternative
after testing. Learning occurs ex-post. (equivalent to
selectionism in [58], [59])
Incremental New Product
Low to LowLow to LowLinear: Process consists of a fixed sequence of several defined gates and
moderate changes in
Medium
Medium
stages
existing functionality,
targeted at existing
markets

recursive and evolving approaches that are discussed, as
descriptive frameworks, in the literature (see Table 3, adapted
from [62]).
Trial-and-error learning builds on experimentation by
introducing an early version of the product to the customer.
The experiment can take the form of a product concept test
(e.g. based on concept descriptions or prototypes), but also
sales of a functional early product version. Tests can also
pertain to critical business model elements. In
entrepreneurship practice, experiments are increasingly
characterized by Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Testing,
which aims at gaining market validation before investments
are mounted on scaling the business. In this context, MVPs
are often mock-ups of software, e-commerce offerings, or
landing pages of future companies. Customers demonstrate
their willingness to accept the product either by buying the
offering despite its limited feature set or by attempting to buy
the future product and making some kind of early stage
commitment (e.g. pre-ordering or leaving their e-mail to
receive further notice when the offering will become
available). In the context of extreme programming (XP)
experimentation takes the form of building products
iteratively through a number of short feedback cycles: a first
product release is designed to fulfill customers’ very basic
needs and as a means to obtain feedback. Complexity is
added to each following release to address unfolding
customer needs but always guided by the principle to
implement the least amount of features that can be expected
to fulfill the expressed need. Releases occur in short intervals
(2 months) and plans, schedules, and sometimes even
contractual agreements pertain to the work required until the
next release, rather than everything that needs to be done to

complete the project. Experimentation-based approaches are
different in what they test, ranging from entire business ideas
to specific functional aspects of a software product, but they
all are characterized by the use of boundary objects to
facilitate high-quality feedback from real-world customers.
Selectionism characterizes a strategy of pursuing multiple
candidate solutions until the best solution can be identified
[63]–[65]. Similarly to Darwinian selection, success depends
on creating solutions with sufficient variability so that at least
one of the variations is good enough to solve the problem and
to apply evolutionary pressure. The latter takes the form of
clear decision points and withdrawal of resources to force the
selection of the best available solution and the end of all other
trials [66] Pharmaceutical companies, for example, often
fund research of different target molecules for addressing the
same medical problem in order to have backup if their lead
molecule fails [59] The practice of set-based design at
Toyota follows the same principle: different functional
groups participating in the development process (e.g.
mechanical design and manufacturing) pursue several
solutions in parallel and communicate them to the other
functional groups. The groups then identify which solutions
in each set are also in the feasible set of the other groups and
pursue them further. As each groups continues to narrow
down its solution set while also making sure that the solutions
remains within the feasible set for the other groups, the final
design evolves [67].
A question of fundamental importance is the specific
context under which trial-and-error and selectionism should
be used. Sommer and Loch model various scenarios and
conclude that trial-and-error learning is superior to
selectionism for all but one scenario, in which the
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unforeseeable uncertainty of the project is caused by its many
interdependencies, rather than its sheer size, and in which
there are credible trials for true market performance [58].
E. Summary of the state-of-the-art
The literature on product innovation management
reviewed above acknowledges a need for targeted flexibility.
For the most part, it assumes that this can be achieved within
the popular phase-gate-approach, by adapting the length of
stages, the nature of the deliverables, and the review criteria
to each project's particular needs. Moreover, within each
phase, project managers are free to choose how they want to
approach the tasks and can, for example, chose trial-and-error
or selectionism. In the front-end, practitioners often rely on
informal approaches that evolve as the projects unfolds,
whereas gated project management frameworks are
recommended later in the development cycle. Even though
the front-end aims to reduce uncertainty and provide stable
plans for the project, radically new innovations encounter
high level uncertainties during project execution, which
results in a heavier emphasis on prototyping,
experimentation, and making up plans as the project moves
along than is the case for incremental projects. When it
comes to radical new products, product development
consequently has a need for ambidexterity through
integration that enables teams to cycle between explorative
and exploitative project activities. Ambidexterity isn’t the
result of a single practices but results from a combination of
project management culture, competencies, and project
management approaches. One of the project management
approaches that enables ambidexterity is the flexible adaption
of how a project is planned and executed, dependent on the
ambiguity and uncertainty of the project. The project
management literature, however, does not yet provide an
integrated framework for such “targeted flexibility”. The
following section therefore introduces the first stage of an
inductive study that investigates managerial practices that
could inform such a framework.
III. A CASE STUDY OF MANAGERIAL PRACTICE
In order to inform the future development of a framework
for targeted flexibility, the goal of the inductive research
presented in this paper is to investigate the nature of
ambiguity and uncertainty, as well as the practical approaches
used to manage them in the context of new product
development projects. Research is still ongoing and the
following sections describe initial results of the first two
research stages: In phase one, R&D managers from 7
companies were interviewed and asked to comment on their
standard development practices, as well as on specific
projects in which the project team followed an approach
different from the standard. Results of this phase informed
the interviews in phase two, during which 4 R&D managers
within the same company commented on a total of 12
projects that followed standard and non-standard processes.

Pre-interviews and analysis of company websites and annual
reports were used to ensure that the companies frequently
launch new products with varying degrees of innovativeness.
All companies selected for the research are small to mid-size
(annual revenue up to 600 million dollars) and organize
research and development activities within the same
organizational units. The interview respondents had
responsibility for multiple product innovation projects as
managers or directors of R&D, product development, and
product management. As such, they were familiar with
projects that range from incremental improvements and
product maintenance to fundamentally new products and
platform initiatives.
Interviews were based on a semi-structured interview
protocol that consisted of three main parts: In the first part,
the respondent was asked to describe the standard process (or
standard processes) their organization employs for managing
product development projects. This serves as a means to
establish a baseline understanding of company practices and
put respondents at easy by acknowledging that the company
usually follows a rational, structured approach. The second
part of the interview uses episodic interviewing and asks
respondents to recall a past project that has deviated from this
baseline process. The respondent describes the reasons for
the deviation, the way in which the project unfolded, the
people involved, and the project outcomes. He or she is also
asked to characterize the project uncertainty and the project
management approach by selecting descriptive statements
from a list of options and to show the uncertainty level of the
project on a graph. For example, a project is identified to
have ‘medium to low’ technology uncertainty when the
respondent agrees with the statement that at the onset of, we
had a good understanding of the technology with only few
uncertainties. In the third part of the interview, respondents
are asked to recall another project that deviated from the
baseline process, but differed from the first project in that it
had a different outcome or different reasons for not
employing the standard process. The interviews such
contained information about the standard process and at least
two different projects that did not follow this process. All
interviews were recorded and two researchers wrote their
field notes and interview summaries separately.
A. Preliminary results of phase 1
The managers in the phase 1 interviews all reported that
their companies employ a linear product development
process, which was frequently referred to as ‘Stage-Gate’.
This process is used as a standard to manage projects with
different degrees of innovation, ranging from fundamentally
new product platforms to incremental product updates. One
company uses two different linear process models for marketdriven development projects that respond to market
opportunities and technology development projects that
originate with an idea by technologists and/or a gap in the
technology roadmap. The market-driven projects are
carefully analyzed and planned upfront and only receive
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approval if a detailed business case is presented. Technology
projects that show future promise for the market are approved
with less formality and upfront planning. Their budgets are
typically small (under $100 K).
Within the linear process framework, the front-end is
treated as a distinctly different phase and either intentionally
designed or at least accepted to be iterative. It is intended to
enable a linear project management approach by reducing
uncertainty and by providing clear project scopes and
timelines. All respondents, however, have reported that they
deviate from their company’s baseline process, typically by
moving projects through gates, even though information is
still missing or by skipping review gates all together. The
main reasons given were time-pressure and/or upper
management decisions to move a project ahead because of a
closing market window or a competitor’s action. Moreover,
Company
Industry
Standard for frontend

projects are moved forward despite missing data because the
data is not and will not be available. Without the detailed
upfront planning assumed in linear process frameworks,
teams resort to a learning based approaches for the remainder
of the project. The interviews did not provide sufficient data
to draw conclusions as to how this practice impacts overall
project success. They did, however, confirm that many
innovation projects do not start with the detailed upfront
plans and contingency plans that linear project management
frameworks aim to achieve and assume for later project
stages. In fact, they appear to be more of an exception than a
rule, particularly in the case of products that are not
incremental enough for markets and technologies to be well
known.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the findings

TABLE 3 SHORT OVERVIEW OF STUDY INTERVIEWS, PART1
1
2
3
Semiconductor
Financial S/W Optical
devices
for
and Services*
biotechnology
and
semiconductors
Relatively linear, focused at the Evolving
Evolving/Recursive
creation of two business plans

4
Medical equipment for doctor’s
offices
Selectionism (parallel concepts
benchmarked
against
each
other), based on job mapping
with customers
Linear SG

Linear but not a fully developed
SG (e.g. only VP approval
required)
No linear process for radical
technology innovations
25-40% of approved projects
are cancelled after initial design
because of market shifts
Yes

Evolving
(Agile
Product
Development)

Linear SG for market-driven
projects ; separate process for
technology projects

Yes

Yes

Yes

When does the
front-end not
follow the
standard?

Lack of discipline (new team
member)
New information forces revisiting of earlier plans
Lack of information, but
company
feels
that
the
information isn’t attainable and
therefore moves forward

No

great urgency/short market
window
top executive wants project

Top executive wants project in
response to a completion
product.
Low levels of uncertainty and
proven need make detailed upfront investigation obsolete

Type of process
exception

Recursive
Front-End

Evolving
Front

Nature of the
project for which
the exception
occurred

New product
to new market

Existing
product to a
new market

Evolving
throughout
project
New product
introduced to
a
known
market

Evolving
throughout
project
New product
to new market

Level of
technological
uncertainty
exception project
Level of market
uncertainty of
exception project

4

2

4

4

Evolving in
front-end and
execution
Modification
of an already
existing
product to a
known market
3

Linear
(no
upfront
homework)
Modification
of an already
existing
product to a
known market
1

5

4

3

2

3

1

Uncertainty Score

9
High
Yes

6
Medium
No

7
Medium
?

6
Medium
?

6
Medium
No

2
Low
Yes

Standard for new
product
development
overall

Process
formalization

Project Success
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Company
Industry
Standard for
front-end
Standard for NPD
in general

TABLE 4 SHORT OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDY INTERVIEW, PART 2
5
6
7
Software development group for Measurement
equipment
for Laser technology
large
consumer
electronics semiconductor industry
company
Evolving (agile development)
Recursive
Evolving
Evolving (agile)

SG, but only recently introduced

Loose, closer to evolving than to linear

Process
Formalization
When does the
front-end not
follow the
standard process?

Yes

Yes

Internal
customer
provided
detailed requirements, enabling a
shorter exploration phase
Third party needs determined SG

Made-to-order custom products
with relatively low market
uncertainty made the fuzzy frontend relatively linear.
Technology challenges caused
project to follow a evolving
pattern, even after it was in
execution

Very little (some standards for documentation
and analysis)
Difficult to determine as there is not clearly
defined process
Strong internal sponsor (e.g. top management)
changes project dynamics

Type of process
exception

Short
cut
Evolving in
early stages

Linear
(compression),
particularly
in
early stages

Evolving
in
late
stages

Front-End
more
linear than
usual

Front end more recursive than
usual

Nature of the
project for which
the exception
occurred

Modification of an
already
existing
product to a
known
market
5

New product to an
existing market

New product
to existing
market

New
product to
a known
market

Existing product for a known
market

Linear
(stage
gate) to comply
with third party
throughout
project
New product to
a known market

4
5
4
2
1
Level of
technological
uncertainty of
exception project
5
3
3
3
1
1
Level of market
uncertainty of
exception project
10
7
8
7
3
2
Uncertainty
High
Medium
Medium-High
Medium
Low
Low
Score*
*Uncertainty assessment at the onset of the project; Scale from 5 (very limited knowledge) to 1 (full understanding)

B. Preliminary results of phase 2
Phase two of this research investigated how a
standardized, linear project management framework is
employed across a company with different product
innovation projects. The chosen case study company is a high
tech equipment manufacturer that has adopted Stage-Gate as
a standard project management approach. The interview
protocol from phase 1 was modified and used to interview the
managers of four development groups, each of which focuses
at a different aspect of the product. Each interviewee was
asked to give 3 cases of past projects that they have
knowledge of. The resulting 12 case descriptions were
analyzed with regard to the project management process
used, the type of the project, its origin, and the level of
ambiguity/uncertainty associated with this project.
The company executes a broad range of product
innovation and technology development projects that are
targeted at bringing cutting edge innovation to market, to
improve current products in response to market and

competitor changes, and to customize products according to
customers’ needs. The company classifies the projects into
the following categories:
Strategic projects: these are radical innovational and
research-focused projects, which aim to create the next
generation technology. They are fuzzy in nature, have a high
level of uncertainty, no clear expectations of the results, and
usually are managed by ‘trial and error’ with poor
documentation. Influential product champions often trigger
strategic projects, such the company founder who is a
recognized technical expert.
Product development projects: these are usually
relatively incremental innovations that respond to needs that
were identified through market research or to produce the
next generation of the product. Projects are well planned,
have clear objectives and medium-low level of uncertainty.
Stage-gate has been used in practice to manage this type of
project.
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Project uncertainty reduced during frontend but new uncertainties shortly before
pilot

Acceptable level of
uncertainty / end of
front-end

Project seemed initially simple
but had a lot uncertainty during
execution

Figure 3: Uncertainty level for two different projects, represented by a respondent

Customized projects: customer driven projects, which
require adding features to existing products or merging the
capabilities of two different products, based on customer
requests. Most of customized projects are about adding or
adjust features. However, they can be large and complex and
often suffer from feature and schedule creep. They may not
be strategically relevant, but because they are targeting
exiting customers, they are important and managed with
priority. A key challenge for these projects is the bidding
process: when customers inquire about a customization, they
expect a binding quote in a relatively short period of time,
leaving little time for upfront homework. Moreover, the
company does not want to overinvest in planning activities
for a project that may or may not happen, depending on if the
customer decides to order or not. As a result, customized
projects have different level of uncertainty. Respondents
reported that in some cases uncertainty was perceived to be
low at the start of the project, but increased in the later stages
when customer requirement became clear or technical
challenges became apparent. Figure 3, which was created by
a respondent during the interview, illustrates this observation.
Respondents consistently comment that a more rigorous
planning process could have avoided some of the challenges
and rework, but not all of it.
Sustaining projects: Sustaining projects are a second
special case of product development projects. They are
planned and executed within a functional team in R&D,
typically in order to address a technical or business need,
such as cost reduction or standardization across different
products. Project budgets are small (typically less than
$10,000) and the need for coordination with other functions
or upper management is minimal. Sustaining projects are
therefore managed outside of the phase-gate process with

approaches that are up to the project team. One example
given by a respondent was a cost reduction of the bill of
materials by $1,500. The project was managed as a WIG
project (wildly important goal), which means that the project
team had a sense of urgency and ideas for improvements
were solicited, evaluated, and quickly implemented. Progress
was tracked weekly against a task list and simple measures
(total cumulative savings, % of ideas in evaluation,
implementation, etc.). The process had no gate reviews. It
had very little uncertainty because the objectives were clear
and the course of action was technologically clear as well.
The company is relatively new to formalized project
management in its R&D organization. The plan is to apply its
phase-gate review process, which is integrated with project
management processes, to all projects with a significant
development effort, including large sustaining efforts and
large custom projects. “Significance” of the development
effort is not solely determined by the budget but can also
apply to small projects with less than $10,000 budgets. Small
projects, however, go through simplified gate reviews, where
(by one respondents’ estimate) as much as 90% of the review
documents and criteria may not apply.
When fully
implemented, the project management office targets to have
70% of the R&D budget managed under the phase-gate
process. The actual number of projects managed through this
framework however, appears to still be small – one
engineering manager estimated that three years into the
process change, only about 10% of all projects (but most
major initiatives) follow phase-gate. Moreover, the
classification of project to determine how they will be
managed is problematic, as illustrated by this quote “We do
not have a defined process and we still do not have a clear
definition of different projects”. It seems a matter of project
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sponsor (sales vs. somebody else) and the origin of the
project, rather than the uncertainty profile of the project, that
determines how it is managed.
Respondents give different reasons for why the company
is changing its approaches to project management in product
development. The respondent from the project management
office emphasizes transparency, which will allow upper
management to more precisely forecast finances (project
budgets and expected future project returns), project
completion and product release dates, and current and future
use of engineering resources. Gate reviews therefore require
updated financials, a comparison of project budget and actual,
a short report on risk factors (including impacts and
contingency and mitigation) and information on staffing
actuals and needs. These insights are expected to support a
streamlining of the project pipeline so that it only contains
projects that are important and will be successful, that are
actively worked on, and that are sufficiently staffed.
Engineering managers agree that the company has difficulties
in prioritizing and culling projects in its development pipeline
and understand that upper management wants more visibility.
However, they are generally more concerned with how to
best manage individual projects and express doubts that one
framework fits all needs, particularly as they are often using
(planned and unplanned) iterative approaches. They
particularly worry that projects that occur within functional
groups, such as many of the sustaining projects, will not only
not benefit from being more closely managed and monitored
but may actually suffer because it complicates things for
project teams that currently require very little coordination.
They also expressed doubts that the added reporting will
result in substantial improvements.
IV. CONCLUSION: EMERGENT THEMES FOR A
FUTURE FRAMEWORK OF TARGETED FLEXIBILITY
Based on a review of the literature and the investigation of
project management practices in eight companies, this study
provides the foundations for a yet-to-be-developed
framework for target flexibility. The key insights, as well as
the future research needs that result from them, can be
summarized as follows:
First, the challenge of ambidexterity, which results in a
need for targeted flexibility [2], is real: the case studies show
that product development teams need to balance exploration
and exploitation not only within the same product
development organization but, in particularly in the case of
radical new innovation, even within the same development
project. Project management activities can support this
ability, among others, by providing documentation of
knowledge for future exploitation, by increasing the
transparency and plannability of projects, and by helping plan
and support explorative strategies [50]. The case study
companies therefore frequently aimed to increase project
management proficiency. Yet, project management practices
may also hinder exploration as the literature highlights [2],

[22]and some of the case study participants express concerns
about. Future research needs to explore these relationships, as
they unfold in practice, in more detail in order to reach
recommendations for targeted flexibility that do not have
unwanted effects.
Second, the front-end is distinct from later project stages
and follows iterative and plan-as-you-go approaches [25],
[26]. Its fundamental aim is to reduce uncertainty enough for
planning-and-control driven project management to take
over, yet the literature and our case studies show that it often
fails to succeed in doing so. One reason may be the inherently
high level of uncertainty for radical innovation. Also,
resources dedicated to uncertainty reduction in the front-end
may not be sufficient, particularly when “sticky” customer
knowledge has to be transferred in, as is the case with the
customized projects in study 2. Future inquiries need to better
understand the root causes of uncertainty as they are
experienced on the ground. This will help answer which of
the many assumed reasons – lack of planning, blind spots,
novelty and a resulting lack of information, dynamic
complexity in large projects, etc. – plays out in which way.
Moreover, the project management discipline needs to
provide more focus and guidance for the pre-project and early
initiation stage, which it currently largely ignores.
Third, as a result of unknown unknowns that emerge in
later project execution stages, project management in R&D is
approached with great flexibility and frequently revised
plans, timelines, and budgets. This flexibility is enabled by
SG, which creates a process for reviewing projects and
revising approaches with upper management buy-in [16].
However, our case studies show that flexibility is rarely
“designed” into the project plans upfront, for example in the
form of clearly planned parallel trials (selectionism) or
defined trial-and-error paths. A likely explanation is that
stage-gate is too “macro” of a framework to focus on the
details of future project execution, whereas project
management practices are too focused on risk management
for known unknowns. A logical starting point for embedding
learning based approaches into project practice are changes to
current project planning standards. New standards need to
shift the focus from planning and monitoring against plans to
planning of learning strategies and monitoring against
learning outcomes. Future research will have to investigate
how this can occur in practice to inform better project
management standards.
Fourth, the case studies show that level of project
management sophistication in new product development
appears to be low. For example, respondents wrongly equate
the State-Gate approach with project management, report on
a lack process clarity and frequent exception-making and
bypassing of procedures, based on authority, and express –
even within the same organization – differences of opinion
about the goals of project management. It appears that in all
companies in our sample, phased-gate approaches from
innovation management were earlier deployed than any form
of traditional project management and standard project
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management tools are relatively underused. An important
question for future research is therefore the transition path
towards higher project management maturity: should R&D
organizations follow a traditional path from repeatable
processes, over building organizational infrastructure to
institutionalized processes and culture? Or should they, if
they already apply phased-gate frameworks, chose a different
path that better reflects their organizational realities?
The currently ongoing analysis of our data 1 , additional
data collection, and future research by the project
management and new product development community are
likely to shed light on these questions and ultimately
contribute to a framework for targeted flexibility
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